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John Schriner
Monitoring the Dark Web
Contrary to what one may expect to read with a title like Monitoring the Dark
Web, this paper will focus less on how law enforcement works to monitor hidden web
sites and services and focus more on how academics and researchers monitor this realm.
The paper is divided into three parts: Part One discusses Tor research and how onion
services work; Part Two discusses tools that researchers use to monitor the dark web; Part
Three tackles the technological, ethical, and social interests at play in securing the dark
web.
Part One: Tor is Research-Driven
Tor (an acronym for 'the onion router' now stylized simply 'Tor') is an anonymity
network in which a user of the Tor Browser connects to a website via three hops: a
guard node, a middle relay, and an exit node. The connection is encrypted with three
layers, stripping a layer at each hop towards its destination server. No single node has
the full picture of the connection along the circuit: the guard knows only your IP but not
where the destination is; the middle node knows the guard and the exit node; the exit
node knows only the middle node and the final destination. The website knows only the
exit node's IP, so it can't determine where the Tor Browser user is located. Tor Project
also works on onion services, which are location-hidden services like web servers of
varied content, IRC servers, and alarmingly, a growing number of command and control
interfaces for botnets.
Tor is research driven1. Tor Project relies on academics around the world to
ethically attack and defend the network. From its start as a project of the Navy, it has
been accepting U.S. government funding. The Tor Project has been making an effort to
1https://research.torproject.org/
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move away from government funding, seeking diversification across many interests and
through crowd-funding [1]. In fact, according to the current director of the Tor Project,
Shari Steele, Tor Project is both funded and attacked by parts of the State Department.

Grants and support from the National Science Foundation as well as the U.S. Naval
Research Laboratory continue to fund and contribute to Tor research [1][2].
Much of the research dealing with Tor is discovering how nation states block Tor
with traffic analysis and deep packet inspection. This guides more research into
obfuscating the Tor protocol to resemble SSL traffic or even Skype [3]. Naturally,
blocking these protocols entirely on the national level would be unpopular to justify if
not technically impossible. These “pluggable transports”—as they're called—continue to
be developed, discovered by censoring nations, and improved; it becomes a cat and
mouse game that has continued for over a decade.
Philip Winter of the Department of Mathematics and Computer Science at
Karlstad University in Sweden has done excellent work in how Tor is now seen as a
censorship-resistance tool; his research involves discovering how the Great Firewall of
China attempts to block Tor, and how users employ Tor bridges to evade the censors [3].
Censoring ISPs or nations are able to block access to the Tor network by blocking access
to known Tor nodes. Bridges are non-publicly listed entry nodes given to users just a few
at a time by simply sending an email or visiting the BridgeDB.2
Web monitoring and censorship in general is beyond the scope of this paper, but
in one country's instance, given a unique data dump of 600 GB of Blue Coat logs in
Syria, we are able to analyze Internet filtering “in the wild.” One study of the logs found
that blocking Tor was inconsistent but aggressive blocking could be correlated to
government aggression and opposition protests (e.g. July-August 2011) [4]. It's important
to note in moving forward in the discussion, that if Tor is successfully blocked,
2 https://bridges.torproject.org/
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the sole method for accessing Tor's onion services is stymied.
Tor Project provides insight into conducting ethical research3. Given that Tor is
used by many to evade censorship and/or browse the web anonymously, engaging in
research that potentially deanonymizes users is unethical. The Tor Research Safety
Board encourages researchers to use a small test network if possible; to attack your own
traffic; only collect data that's safe to make public; the benefits should outweigh the
risks. They encourage researchers to ask for assistance and Tor Project will supply inperson help. When Carnegie Melon University (CMU) was reportedly paid to
deanonymize Tor users for the FBI and are yet to help Tor Project fix the vulnerability,
the question of ethics comes into discussion: as Shari Steele notes, it's problematic too
because CERT4 comes out of CMU [1].
Defining the dark web is a point of inconsistency across the clearnet. The dark
web is often confused with the Deep Web. The Deep Web is all non-public web material
that isn’t indexed by search engines [5]: this includes corporate intranet sites, paywalled
material, and government and corporate databases. The dark web is included in this Deep
Web but it's something different: these are web sites that can only be accessed using
special software like Tor Browser or I2P. Although these websites often use popular web
server software like Apache or Nginx, their IP—and hence their location—is kept hidden.
Tor Project has developed onion services (formerly “hidden services”) since 2002
[6]. To visit an onion service, a user needs to be proxied through the Tor network. Web
services routed through Tor belong to the Dark Web. The Tor Browser connects a user to
an onion service (website) and keeps both entities from learning the IP of the other. This
is done through introduction points and the negotiation of a Rendezvous Point5. Hidden
services, as we have made clear, are location-hidden and thus very difficult to take down.

3 https://research.torproject.org/safetyboard.html
4 https://www.cert.org/
5 https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en
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Alongside its portal for Tor Research, Tor Project has a portal for Tor Metrics6.
This portal keeps track of the number of volunteer relays, the location and number of
exit nodes, bandwidth-use, and extrapolated onion service metrics like the number of
.onion sites and onion service traffic. Traffic to Tor onion services is still a very small
percentage of total Tor traffic; statistics released by Tor Project extrapolated data from a
small set of volunteer relays to estimate between 2% - 5% of all Tor traffic involves
onion services [7][8].
The anonymity network I2P (Invisible Internet Project)7 is lesser-known than Tor
but shares some of the fundamental properties like wrapped layers of encryption
(sometimes called garlic routing because it bundles messages together to evade traffic
analysis) as well as hiding the location of services like web servers, integrated clients for
peer-to-peer networks, Internet Relay Chat, and gateways to the clearnet. I2P also relies
on academic research to further its mission of providing anonymity. I2P documentation
refers researchers to the ethics outlined by the Tor Project [9]. This decentralized
approach to providing anonymity and censorship-resistant services will be the future of
the internet; in fact, Brewster Kahle of the Internet Archive foresees a shift to a
decentralized web and reminds us that the way we use the internet is not set in stone—we
can invent new protocols and new ways of hosting and sharing content [10].
We will discuss content expansively in Part Three, but Onion Services using
webservers with hidden locations may host a wide variety of content from illegal drug
markets, gambling, child abuse image forums, contract killers, to political opposition web
sites, chans (image forums), a gateway to Facebook (if it's blocked in your native
country), or repositories of academic papers, like Sci-Hub. Some of these websites are
only available through Tor whereas some have clearnet versions that can succumb to
DNS-takedowns, TLD seizures, hosting-takedowns, or ISP/government monitoring.
6 https://metrics.torproject.org/
7 https://geti2p.net/en/
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Part Two: Tools to Monitor the Dark Web
OnionScan8 is a tool written in Go that checks for website vulnerabilities,
misconfigurations, and operational security holes in onion services. The purpose of the
project is to help secure services, but it’s also a tool to monitor and track Dark Web
sites. By making research and investigation into these sites easier and public, the project
hopes to “create a powerful incentive for new anonymity technology” [11]. Indeed,
OnionScan notes that government agencies scan the Dark Web but they don't release
their findings [12]; OnionScan provides data and regular reports of its findings.9
OnionScan tests various problems with the an onion site’s configurations[13]:
one of the largest misconfigurations is mod_status if the server is running Apache.
mod_status is useful for debugging but isn’t enabled by default. If an administrator
enabled it and forgot about it, anyone who queries an Apache server’s mod_status sees
myriad leaked information about the server, including real IP address, other hosted Dark
Web and clearnet sites, and secret areas of the website [14].
OnionScan checks for open directories: instead of an index.html, one may be able
to get an index of images in /images/ or even backup copies of the site or databases in
/backups/. OnionScan checks to see whether or not the server strips EXIF data from
images. EXIF data may include the make of a camera or phone and even geolocation
data. This metadata can be used fingerprint a user if images properties are identical or
even find the location of cocaine for sale on the Silk Road, one of the largest earlier drug
markets [15].
OnionScan identifies and captures Google Analytics scripts as webmasters will
haphazardly use the same unique code on several sites they administrate, including
clearnet sites. Onionscan identifies cryptocurrency addresses that can correlated a shared
8 https://github.com/s-rah/onionscan
9 https://onionscan.org/
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Bitcoin or Litecoin wallet on another site.
The newest version of OnionScan has a Correlation Lab10 which links
previously-scanned sites to new ones using a number of recorded properties including
the aforementioned mod_status server identity leak, correlated clearnet versions of a site,
or mistakenly-shared personally-identifying information like an email address.
The health of a project like this is crucial to maintaining continued scanning of
the Dark Web and improvement of the tools. OnionScan, and projects like it, rely on
contributors who can test, code, write documentation, and find bugs. OnionScan is still a
new project and currently has two active developers. One good indication of a project's
health is the number of issues: OnionScan currently has 68 issues, 41 that are closed.
Lastly, another good indication of health from the GitHub page is that OnionScan has
been forked 114 times, possibly leading to independent projects in monitoring the Dark
Web. When discussing open source projects it's good to remember that projects rely on
others to function: for example, the secure linux operating systems Tails and Qubes rely
on the Tor protocol for access to the internet.
The Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)11 is a project whose
aim is to provide software tests to determine if clearnet websites, VPNs, Tor, or
messaging software are being blocked by one's ISP or government[16]. It also checks to
see if packets are being filtered or tampered with. Volunteers around the globe run the
toolset and report the findings; the results are historic and current data on censorship at
the ISP and national level. Only by monitoring the monitors do we find out what they
are attempting to block or manipulate.

10 https://github.com/s-rah/onionscan/blob/master/doc/correlation-lab.md
11 https://ooni.torproject.org/
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Part Three: Monitoring the content of the Dark Web
There are now several papers and studies that have categorized the content of the
Dark Web available via Tor. One such study, and the first to systematically look at the
content of onion services, found three indexes of onion service websites 12 and classified the
1171 sites by content (e.g. drugs, hacking, child abuse, pornography, etc.)[6]. An analysis of
the 2165 posts is made on the material after one month of collection. The posts are
categorized as subversive, ethical, or unethical. The researcher found that the vast majority of
posts exhibited malign (unethical) disinhibition–the removal of self-censorship online–and
that onion services are “used predominantly to evade repression from the state, but for
matters that are highly unethical”[6]. The study found that very little content was political or
socially subversive material. The author questions the role of onion services: “currently, the
hidden services act as a protector of unethical content rather than the promoter of a censorfree place for ethical content” [6]. There are obvious shortcomings with the study: the author
treats all pornography as “unethical, as it raises moral concerns” and excludes topics
discussing surveillance entirely as “they belong rather to the field of politics and governance
than morality” [6]. Alongside these two questionable assertions, the sample size of 2165
posts in the time frame of one month may be an interesting snapshot but may lack the content
to really gauge its value. Providing context, 4chan, a clearnet image board where users may
post as 'anonymous,' suffers from the same pithy statements and hate-speech alongside
redeeming content–and boasts 900,000 posts each day[17]. One can clearly see the
similarities of posting 'anonymous' on 4chan and actual anonymity using Tor; there are signs
of both malign and benign disinhibition. The author concludes that because of the unethical
content the best solution would be to stop the development of Tor onion services. This would
not affect using Tor Browser to visit websites anonymously, but there would be no .onion
sites.
12 The three indexes were The Hidden Wiki, Snapp BBS, and Ahmia.fi
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As academics look at the conversation of academics as 'scholarly communication'
we may note how Tor onion services have been a topic at every hacker convention. At
the Chaos Communications Congress (31c3, 2014) Gareth Owen discussed the results of
his research into content of onion services[18]. Owen and his team set up 40 high-speed
relays for six months that had the HSDir flag set—after 25 hours they had a place in
maintaining the Distributed Hash Table (DHT) and could thus monitor the onion service
requests being made. This work is similar to Donncha O'Cearbhaill's research into
mapping the DHT [19] and foundational work examining the bug that these researchers
would use to discover onion service requests and collect destination URLs [20]. After
collecting the requests at over 45,000/day, Owen's team scraped the website's root page
for text only and categorized the content. They found that the top 40 spots in popularity
belonged to botnet command and control servers13. Most of these requests would fail,
however, because, as in the case of the Skynet botnet, the admin had been arrested and
the C&C removed. This doesn't stop the zombie machines from still trying to connect,
however. They found that the majority of successful connections/visits/lookups were to
sites categorized as child abuse. It's unclear if these requests are by bots or humans—this
troubling detail is something we cannot presently know. Tor Project suggests that
protective services crawl the sites regularly in an effort to identify abused children. Nick
Mathewson, co-founder of Tor Project, notes that directory requests do not give an
accurate number of actual visits, and the actual traffic doesn't go through the HSDir at all
but rather through rendezvous points, as mentioned above. Further, Mathewson describes
how data derived from hidden service directory requests are skewed:

13 This was similar to O'Cearbhaill findings around the same time, noting that many were bitcoin-mining
botnets
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“a methodology that looks primarily at hidden service directory requests will over-rate
services that are frequently accessed from a Tor client that hasn't been there recently,
and under-rate services that are used via tor2web, and so on. It also depends a lot on how
hidden services are configured, how frequently Tor hidden service directories go up and
down, and what times of day they change introduction points in comparison to what time
of day their users tend to be awake. The greater the number of distinct hidden services a
person visits, and the less reliable those sites are, the more hidden service directory requests
they will trigger.” [21]
We will continue to see sites like Sci-Hub mirror their clearnet domains with
onion services. Sci-Hub is a controversial academic paper repository much discussed in
the academic world. It has been called “the PirateBay for scientists.” Sci-Hub calls to
question whether the copyright system in the United States is really made to “promote
science and the useful arts.” It has surpassed over 50 million academic articles, reportedly
containing a large percentage of Elsevier content and other for-profit vendors in academic
publishing [22]. When the domain sci-hub.org was seized my a court injunction in New
York, Sci-Hub moved to sci-hub.io, a TLD that could not easily be seized coupled with
servers located in Russia, outside of U.S. courts' jurisdiction. Of course the Sci-Hub
onion service server14 could be located anywhere and it's now incredibly difficult to take
down. In fact, Sci-Hub now offers a bot using Telegram messaging app that instantly
provides academic articles when given the title or the DOI of the academic article [23].
Tools like OnionScan, by showing correlated sites as mirrors of the same
operation, can help us to attain better data about content. If an online casino, for
example, has 10 onion service sites that are found to be run by the same operator, this
may lead us to see that it's not that online gambling is rampant but rather they are just
mirrors. OnionScan's reports may lead us to finding out why some sites have longevity
while others disappear very quickly. OnionScan will be forked into projects that help us
shine a light on, and gather great amounts of data from, onion services.
The intrinsic problem with monitoring content of Tor onion services is that Tor
14 scihub22266oqcxt.onion
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onion services and sites on I2P are purposely difficult to monitor; there is no way to get
conclusive data without conflating or surmising. Roger Dingledine, a lead developer for
Tor Project notes that they often think about scrapping onion services [24]. He is
apprehensive about this though: he notes that they're very early in the development and
there are some really compelling use cases like Facebook's onion service, or activist
blogs that are DDoS-resistant. “We need to keep improving performance, consistency,
and ease-of-use if we want to get beyond the very early adopters and see these usecases take off” [24].
As more sites offer onion services for those living in blocked countries, maybe
we'll see a change in the content. With the rise of ransomware command and control
servers, drug markets popping up to replace ones taken down, FBI serving up malware
to identify users–we can look forward to continuing the cat and mouse game we've been
playing for a time now. Then again, with such a small percentage of Tor traffic going to
onion services (2%-5%), perhaps the early adopters are the problem and we're just
witnessing the pains of technology, law, and society workout their coexistence. By
improving our tools to monitor the dark web, we'll have a better grounding to see in
what direction we're headed.
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An accompanying presentation of 'Monitoring the Dark Web' may be found at:
https://github.com/johnschriner/presentations
A note on citations: I've used APA citation style but also added footnotes for material I
would call 'quick links'; these are optional background materials and not necessarily
materials to be cited.

